My last blog discussed the Reiber and Weinburg study of jurors that revealed a potential problem with our current juror system: lay
jurors struggle to comprehend factually and procedurally complex cases. The blog also questioned the suggestions for professional
juror reform because of the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating
professional jurors comprehend complex
cases better than lay jurors. Furthermore,
my last blog did not even discuss the logistical, political, and constitutional hurdles that a professional juror reform would face. Today’s blog will discuss whether there are
alternative jury reforms that can improve juror comprehension at a fraction of
the cost and complication of implementing professional jurors.
First,
there are jury reforms that could improve juror comprehension with nothing more than reorganizing the structure of the trial.
A very common sense reform involves providing thorough jury instructions
before argumentation begins. One
commentator has likened receiving jury instruction after hearing argumentation
to being asked to score a foreign sporting event but not learning the rules of
the game until after you observe the match. Another intuitive reform would
be to provide for interim summations of the evidence and interim deliberations
for the jurors. The benefits of hearing interim summation
would be multiple chances to hear the same information, thereby improving the
odds of comprehension. Furthermore,
interim deliberations could prevent help prevent information cascades because
the interim session would allow jurors to discuss evidence and then come out of
the deliberation room and hear further evidence. (Information cascades occur in groups: when individuals lack information, each individual will choose in line with the other individuals on the rationale that the other individual had information informing her decision).
Second,
there are jury reforms that could improve juror comprehension by providing pedagogical aids to jurors. One reform has already
been implemented in some jurisdictions and involves nothing more than allowing
jurors to take notes in all civil cases. The empirical evidence indicates that
note-taking leads to better recollection, which could improve comprehension and
help avoid what economists and social psychologists refer to as information
cascades. Other reforms
calling for pedagogical aids are more controversial than allowing jurors to
take notes. One reform would allow jurors to submit written questions to expert
witnesses. Both the questions and the
answers could be filtered by the court to ensure that they comply with rules of
evidence. Some commentators also suggest
appointment of someone educated in the subject matter as an adviser to the
jury. In theory these reforms would assist the jury
with comprehension, but concerns arise regarding how to phrase the answers to
the jury’s questions and how to select the adviser. Litigants in complex civil cases are almost
sure to disagree over the phrasing of the court’s response to a written
question from the jury to an expert and the jury reform would need to set forth
a dispute resolution standard and procedure.
Another
group of reforms could attempt to mitigate remaining comprehension problems
that other reforms could not correct.
For example, procedural complexity in cases could be resolved by
submitting a granulated verdict form to juries. Although the jury reforms highlighted in this blog seem mundane and even common sense, the fact that they are simple does not mean that they will be ineffective. These reforms that attempt to reconcile the civil trial process with empirical research about human comprehension should be implemented before any professional jury system.
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