In the United States the jury is often held up as the
pinnacle of the judicial process.
Curiously though, the Supreme Court of the United States has only ever
seated a jury in one reported case, Georgia v. Brailsford (1794) (there are two other known examples of the Court in
this era seating juries in unreported cases, but none after 1797).
Admittedly, under Article 3 Section 2 of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in cases
involving foreign diplomats and cases where a state is a party. But, under the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court
is technically required to empanel a jury in any original jurisdiction case
before it where a jury would have been required at common law. This appears to not happen often, because most
of the original jurisdiction cases seen by the Court have been equity cases
that did not require a jury. However, it
is still remarkable both that in 225 years the Supreme Court has only had one reported
jury trial, and that the jury trial in question occurred 220 years ago.
Georgia v. Brailsford
is probably best known for Chief Justice Jay’s declaration to the jury “that on
questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is
the province of the Court to decide. But
it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable
distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon
yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy.” Through Jay’s above words
Georgia v. Brailsford is in fact
often held to have set up in the right of jury nullification in American courts.
The case itself was not that remarkable. Basically, during the Revolutionary War, Georgia
passed a law confiscating the debts owed by Georgia citizens to aliens. After the war two South Carolinians and a
British subject who were owed a debt from a Georgia citizen sued to recover the
debt. The Court paneled a “special jury”
who heard the arguments before the Court.
After the arguments the Court gave its opinion of the law to the jury,
telling them that in their opinion the Georgia law could not have confiscated
the debts owed to the two South Carolinians.
With regard to the debt owed to the British subject the Court said that
it was only sequestered while a state of war existed between the former
American Colonies and Great Britain, that the debt always remained the property
of the British subject, and that the debt should be returned to him now that a
state of peace existed between the two countries. Then Chief Justice Jay made the comment generally
thought of as authorizing jury nullification, before sending the jury off to deliberate.
After deliberating the jury agreed with the Court
and ordered that the debt confiscated by Georgia be returned to all three
original creditors.
Today, apparently for reasons of practicality (which may
also include a perceived impracticality of empaneling a jury), in those rare
instances when the Court needs to determine matters of fact in an original
jurisdiction case it appoints a “special master” who serves as a fact finder
and reports what their investigation uncovered to the Court.
While this system of “special masters” might be more convenient
for the Supreme Court, one wonders whether or not this system itself may be unconstitutional,
or at the very least against the spirit of the system authorized by the framers
to allow juries to decide the original jurisdiction cases before the Supreme Court.
In any case, it does not appear that the 220 year legal
drought of no published Supreme Court opinions with jury verdicts will be
ending any time soon.
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