The Sixth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution demands that criminal defendants in America “enjoy
the right” to an impartial jury. The Seventh Amendment “preserves” that right for
civil trials. Judges and attorneys
conduct voir dire in an attempt to weed out jurors who cannot be impartial (whether
or not the juror knows about his/her bias), and many have written on the
critical importance of avoiding bias within our juries. However, the way we currently discuss bias
may not be in the best interest of justice, and the framers may not have intended
for courts to reject all jurors who display a degree of bias during jury
selection.
What does it mean to be “impartial”?
The United
States Supreme Court breaks down the term “impartial” into two components. First, the group from which the parties de-select
petit jurors (the venire) must represent a “cross section” of the defendant’s community. The Court’s reasoning suggests that this
first component seeks to avoid racially segregated juries. Second, the jurors who eventually sit on the
petit jury must be “unbiased,” which the means that the jurors must be “willing
to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented.” This second component spawned the voir dire
process, whereby judges and attorneys ask the venire questions that, in theory,
should expose juror bias. After the
court uncovers bias, the court should grant a strike against that juror for
cause.
When
deciding whether to strike a juror for cause, research indicates that courts
rely most heavily on a potential juror’s self-assessment of his/her bias. For example, during voir dire, judges sometimes
directly ask jurors whether they can be fair.
Other times, the questioner will ask indirect questions to bate the
potential juror into revealing a secret like/dislike for one party. In both scenarios, the juror must be
consciously aware of his/her predispositions.
In practice, the court searches for any glaring, obvious feelings within
jurors that, should the juror be impaneled, would negate the possibility of an impartial
jury.
A more nuanced definition of “bias”
Implicit in this process is the idea that
some bias within jurors is inevitable (and possibly desired). Our system often limits the form of voir dire
so that questioners must generally speak to the venire as a whole, even though research
shows that the direct questioning of jurors increases the likelihood of the
court granting a strike for cause. When courts
rely on a potential juror’s self-assessments, the court knows that some bias
will make it onto the jury. Therefore,
our system ensures that the Constitution’s impartiality requirement often
remains unfulfilled.
The framers could have defined “impartial”
within the Amendments, but they chose not to.
Their vague language suggests that the framers intended for some level of
biased thinking to exist within juries (or perhaps they understood the
impossibility of rooting out all partiality). Either way, our system plays out how the
framers likely intended, with the court striking the extremely biased jurors for
cause, but allowing the milder biases to remain.
Our jurisprudence should adopt a
description of “impartial” that considers how milder biases could be beneficial
to the deliberation process. For example,
if all twelve jurors bring mild, conflicting biases to the discussion, that
jury may reach a deeper level of truth than a jury that a more neutral-minded
jury may overlook. Mild biases in calmer
jurors may help them resist the pressure imposed by type-A jurors. Our system implicitly supports this idea when
it demands a petit jury of a larger size.
Instead of describing jurors as “biased” or “unbiased,” we should
discuss individual jurors’ feelings in terms of degree. While a severely biased juror will likely
destroy deliberations entirely, a mildly biased juror may provide beneficial insight
into deliberations. We should note the
difference.
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